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RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AS REMARKABLY 
INSIGNIFICANT 
 
R. GEORGE WRIGHT* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article introduces the right of publicity through a brief consideration of high 
profile cases involving, respectively, Paris Hilton, human cannonball Hugo Zacchini, 
and the famous actress Olivia de Havilland. With this background understanding, the 
Article considers the supposed risks to freedom of speech posed by recognizing rights 
of publicity in a private party. From there, the Article addresses the nagging concern 
that the publicity rights cases promote a harmful “celebrification” of culture. Finally, 
the Article considers whether allowing for meaningful damage recoveries in publicity 
rights cases appropriately compensates victims in ways promoting the broad public 
interest. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To qualify as insignificant, a right should neither substantially promote the general 
well-being, nor impose substantial social costs.1 Despite its visibility, the right of 
                                                          
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 
 1  Very roughly, publicity rights claims involve the non-consensual commercial use, short 
of false endorsement, of one’s name or identity. See infra text accompanying notes 23, 28. The 
visibility of right of publicity claims often flows in part from the popular familiarity of one or 
both contending parties. 
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publicity qualifies in both respects and thus deserves neither celebration, nor 
denunciation, but instead, obscurity.2  
This Article introduces the right of publicity through a brief consideration of high 
profile cases involving, respectively, Paris Hilton,3 human cannonball Hugo Zacchini,4 
and the famous actress Olivia de Havilland.5 With this background understanding, the 
Article considers the supposed risks to freedom of speech posed by recognizing rights 
of publicity in a private party.6 From there, the Article addresses the nagging concern 
that the publicity rights cases promote a harmful “celebrification” of culture.7 Finally, 
the Article considers whether allowing for meaningful damage recoveries in publicity 
rights cases appropriately compensates victims in ways promoting the broad public 
interest.8  
Taken together, these considerations establish the jurisprudential insignificance, in 
general, of familiar publicity right claims.9 These claims involve neither significant 
good, nor significant harm, to basic values, crucial interests, or to our sense of 
fundamental justice.10 Instead, publicity right claims are best thought of as a mere legal 
accretion.11 In hopes, then, of discouraging further attention of the subject, we turn to 
the nature of publicity right claims in general.  
 II. THE NATURE OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS 
Right of publicity claims arise in a range of contexts. No single case can be 
illustrative of all others in all respects. But for the sake of an initial appreciation of the 
nature of publicity right claims, consider first the familiar protagonists in Hilton v. 
Hallmark Cards.12 Paris Hilton initiated this litigation because of Hallmark’s sale of a 
birthday card described by the court in these terms:  
 
                                                          
 2  Kelli L. Sager, Summary of Right of Publicity Issues, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
(2012), 
https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.ku.edu/files/docs/media_law/Summary_of_Right_of_Publicity_Is
sues.pdf. 
 3  See infra text accompanying notes 12–29. 
 4  See infra text accompanying notes 30–53. 
 5  See infra text accompanying notes 55–80. 
 6  See infra Section III. 
 7  See infra Section IV. 
 8  See infra Section V. 
 9  See infra Section VI. 
 10  See id. 
 11  Accretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (referring to a gradual, cohesive 
accumulation). “Accretion” refers to a process that is more neutral in its connotations than, say, 
“excrescence,” which suggests not just growth, but unattractiveness or abnormality as well. Id. 
 12  Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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The front cover of the card contains a picture above a caption that reads 
“Paris’ First Day as a Waitress.”13 The picture depicts a cartoon waitress 
complete with apron, serving a plate of food to a restaurant patron. An 
oversized photograph of Hilton’s head is super-imposed on the cartoon 
waitress’ body. Hilton says to the customer, “Don’t touch that, it’s hot.” 
The customer asks, “What’s hot?”14 Hilton replies, “That’s hot.”15 The 
inside of the card reads “Have a smokin’ hot birthday.”16  
 
The inspiration for the Hallmark card in question was apparently a particular 
episode of “The Simple Life”17 and from Hilton’s association with the phrase “that’s 
hot.” The court observed that in many of her show’s episodes, “Hilton says ‘that’s hot’ 
whenever she finds something interesting or amusing.” 18 In fact, Hilton had registered 
the phrase as a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.19 
Our concern, though, is not with trademark infringement issues but with right of 
publicity actions. In this case, Paris Hilton sued under California state common law,20 
as distinct from California state statutory law.21 In general, a right of publicity refers 
to “the right of an individual, especially a public figure or a celebrity, to control the 
commercial value and exploitation of his name and picture or likeness and prevent 
others from unfairly appropriating this value for commercial benefit.”22 Most 
concisely, “[p]ublicity rights . . . are a form of property protection that allows people 
to profit from the full commercial value of their identities,”23 while generally 
exempting newsworthy, public interested, or merely incidental commercial use of that 
                                                          
 13  This language was taken to refer to the Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie joint television 
venture entitled “The Simple Life.” See id. at 898. 
 14  One might imagine that under the circumstances, the answer would have been obvious, 
but matters are, on the trademark front, a bit more complicated. See id. 
 15  Invoking thereby a trademark infringement issue. See id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 899.  
 18  Id. at 898. 
 19  See id. 
 20  See id. 
 21  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (1971); see also id. § 990 (1984). 
 22  McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 23  Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
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identity.24 The right of publicity does not, for our purposes, rely on the claim that the 
plaintiff uses, endorses, or has any relation to the commercial venture at issue.25  
The plaintiff in right of publicity cases need not be a nationally recognized 
celebrity or other public figure,26 but the plaintiff typically bears the burden of showing 
that there is economic value in associating their identity with the commercial activity 
of the defendant.27 In some states, publicity rights can be held as property for a 
specified period of years post-mortem.28 Typically, the plaintiff’s consent to the 
defendant’s use of his or her identity understandably precludes a claim of wrongful 
appropriation.29  
Historically, the well-known case of Hugo Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co. gave the right of publicity momentum.30 This case involved the 
defendant’s single local television broadcast of the entirety of Zacchini’s fifteen 
second circus act31 in which Zacchini, the “human cannonball,”32 was shot out of a 
cannon into a net some 200 feet distant.33 The film in question was taken at the Geauga 
                                                          
 24  See id. at 969. 
 25  See id. at 967–68; Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 
2001) (noting that the right of publicity is often loosely invoked “when the appropriation of a 
celebrity likeness creates a false and misleading impression that the celebrity is endorsing the 
product.”). False and misleading claims of celebrity product endorsement are separately 
actionable as consumer fraud, or as unfair competition, under state or federal law. Trademark 
infringement cases typically involve questions of consumer confusion over whether the plaintiff 
is somehow affirmatively associated with the defendant’s allegedly infringing mark. See, e.g., 
Mutual of Omaha, Inc. v. Novak, 835 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg 
Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987); WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 
1984). 
 26  See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). Query 
whether the bearer of the publicity right need be a human, or even a non-fictional person. See 
Dawn H. Dawson, The Final Frontier: Right of Publicity in Fictional Characters, 2001 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 635, 645 (2001). 
 27  See Landham, 227 F.3d at 624. 
 28  See, e.g., Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 
1983); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 9:17 (2d ed. 
2017) (providing more comprehensive coverage). But see Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., 
Inc., 616 F. 2d 956, 959–60 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting a postmortem right of publicity). 
 29  See, e.g., Pratt v. Everalbum, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 664, 669 (E.D. Ill. 2017); JENNIFER 
E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 1 (2018) 
(“[t]he right of publicity is something we all have—it is the right to stop others from using our 
identities, particularly our names and likenesses, without permission. It is sometimes thought of 
as a property right in one’s personality.”).  
 30  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 31  See id. at 563. 
 32  See id. 
 33  See id. 
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County Fair in Burton, Ohio.34 The film was broadcasted as part of the local 11:00 
p.m. news, along with favorable promotive commentary.35  
As it happened, the fair charged no separate fee, beyond that of general admission 
to the county fair itself, in connection with Zacchini’s act.36 Zacchini sought money 
damages,37 however, on a number of related theories,38 with the Ohio Supreme Court 
focusing on the theory of “the right to the publicity value of his performance.”39 
Zacchini sought to draw a general distinction between the protected or privileged 
broadcast of newsworthy events on the one hand,40 and what amounts to the non-
consensual appropriation of a performer’s entire act on the other.41  
Zacchini’s right of publicity claim focused, understandably in this particular case, 
not on wounded feelings, emotional reactions, damage to reputation, or to a sense of 
personal violation or indignity,42 but on a sense of entitlement to the restoration of his 
pecuniary losses.43 The United States Supreme Court declared that the unauthorized 
broadcast of Zacchini’s entire act amounted to “a substantial threat to the economic 
value”44 of that act. The Court assumed that “if the public can see the act free on 
television, it will be less willing to see it at the fair.”45 The defendant’s broadcast was 
                                                          
 34  See id. 
 35  See id. 
 36  See id. 
 37  See id. 
 38  See id. 
 39  Id. at 565 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ohio 
1979)). 
 40  See id. at 569. 
 41  See id. This dichotomy does not address whether, for right of publicity purposes, a 
performance could be newsworthy, and thus perhaps privileged, in its entirety, above and 
beyond any excerpts or selections therefrom. In the related context of copyright, see More 
Information on Fair Use, COPYRIGHT.GOV (Jul. 2018), https://www.copyright.gov/fair-
use/more-info.html (amount or substantiality, including entirety, of use as a statutorily 
balanceable fair use factor) (citing the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 
2541, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018)). 
 42  See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. By way of a possible partial contrast, consider the nature 
of actress Olivia de Havilland’s claim in de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (re depiction of plaintiff, perhaps with regard to her famous sister). 
 43  See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
 44  Id. at 575. 
 45  Id. 
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thus said to function similarly to a prohibition on Zacchini’s charging a fee to witness 
his performance.46  
There is much to say about Zacchini’s claim of economic injury in this case. We 
address this claim, as well as broader concerns over damages recoveries in right of 
publicity cases, more generally below.47 In Zacchini itself, the Court was open to an 
economic damages recovery for a broadcast of the plaintiff’s entire act.48  
The United States Supreme Court in Zacchini recognized that constitutional issues 
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press were connected with the case.49 
Entertainment, the Court declared, can overlap with the category of “important 
news.”50 The Court more strongly asserted that “[t]here is no doubt that entertainment 
as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.”51 The Court assumed, however, 
that some sort of licensing or payment to the plaintiff could allow for broadcasting of 
the act in question.52 We shall address these issues, as well the broader First 
Amendment status of entertainment speech, below.53  
With the proliferation of the right of publicity post-Zacchini,54 a wide range of 
circumstances and issues have arisen. These issues were on display in the 
contemporary case of de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC.55 The de Havilland case 
proceeded on several distinct theories of recovery,56 but most importantly on a 
                                                          
 46  See id. at 575–76. 
 47  See infra Section V. 
 48  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576–77 
 49  See id. at 577–79. 
 50  See id. at 578. 
 51  Id.; see also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (nude dancing 
case); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (constitutional protection of 
even purely instrumental music); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (commercial 
barroom nude dancing); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (violent video 
games rented to teenagers). In the right of publicity context, see de Havilland v. FX Networks, 
LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (“entertainment is entitled to the same 
protection as the exposition of ideas”); Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 
459 (Cal. 1979). For more information, see Dora Georgeseu, Two Tests Unite to Resolve the 
Tension Between the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 
918 (2014). 
 52  See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578. 
 53  See infra Section III. 
 54  See Gugliemi, 603 P.2d at 454; de Havilland, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 625; see also Hart v. 
Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); Wis. Interscholastic Ath. Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 
658 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011); Armstrong v. Eagle Rock Entm’t, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 799 
(2009). 
 55  de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 625. 
 56  Id. at 631. Damages were sought for emotional distress, harm to reputation, past and 
future economic losses, profits attributable to the defendant’s unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s 
identity, along with punitive damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction. See id. 
Recovery was predicated on theories of the common law privacy tort known as 
misappropriation, the California state statutory privacy right, the privacy tort known as “false 
light,” and unjust enrichment. See id. 
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California state statutory right of publicity claim.57 The case focused on the television 
broadcast of an eight-part docudrama,58 ultimately nominated for eighteen Emmy 
Awards,59 entitled “Feud: Bette and Joan.”60 The title names referred respectively to 
the actresses Bette Davis and Joan Crawford,61 on whom the docudrama crucially 
focused.62 The entire docudrama ran for a total of 392 minutes,63 with the Olivia de 
Havilland character, played by Catherine Zeta-Jones,64 appearing on screen for 
seventeen of those minutes.65  
Overall, the de Havilland character is portrayed as “beautiful, glamorous, self-
assured, and considerably ahead of her time in her views on the importance of equality 
and respect for women in Hollywood.”66 The plaintiff did indeed object to the 
substance of some of her character’s dialogue, including an allegedly false and vulgar 
reference to de Havilland’s sister, the actress Joan Fontaine.67  
Important for our purposes, though, is that the plaintiff’s objections to several lines 
of her character’s dialogue,68 including that concerning her sister, were evidently 
raised not under a right of publicity theory, but under the separate and distinct claim 
of “false light” invasion of privacy.69 False light privacy invasion claims, as a separate 
and distinct tort, are widely recognized in the law.70 
                                                          
 57  See id. The most relevant California right of publicity statute is again Cal. Civ. Code § 
3344 (1971); see also id. § 990 (1984) (providing for descendibility of the statutory right). 
 58  See de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630. 
 59  See id. at 631. 
 60  See id. at 630. 
 61  See id. 
 62  See id. at 630–31. 
 63  See id. at 630. 
 64  See id. 
 65  See id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  See id. at 633.  
 68  See id. 
 69  See id. 
 70  See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 398–401 (1960) 
(discussing false and objectively highly offensive characterizations of a plaintiff tending to 
impair the plaintiff’s reputation, as well as to impose psychological harms, where the false 
statement need not be defamatory); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967) 
(requiring as well the showing, in a false light invasion of privacy case, of actual malice on the 
part of the defendant publisher when the speech involves matters of interest to the public); 
Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Ohio 2007) (recognizing the tort of false light 
invasion of privacy under Ohio state law). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
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Under California right of publicity law,71 crucial to the disposition of de 
Havilland’s claim, is whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity was merely 
appropriative and imitative, or else was creatively “transformative”72 of that identity, 
such that the value of the defendant’s product—with specific reference to the use of 
the plaintiff’s identity—derives more from the defendant’s own creativity than from 
the pre-existing economic value of the plaintiff’s identity.73 
In de Havilland’s case, the court determined that the entirety of the Zeta-Jones and 
de Havilland portion of the docudrama amounted to about 4.2% of the docudrama’s 
total content.74 The court found “no evidence that de Havilland as a character was a 
significant draw”75 to overall viewership or the general market stature of the 
docudrama.76 Thus, the court concluded that whatever reception the docudrama 
received, at least in financial terms, was attributable less to the plaintiff’s pre-existing 
identity than to the defendant’s artistically creative transformation of that identity, 
assuming that either of these elements contributed in any distinctive way to the 
economic value of the overall docudrama.77 
Going further, the court immunized not just the docudrama itself, but also the 
defendant’s use of de Havilland’s name in related “social media promotion,”78 or what 
amounts to mere commercial advertising, of the docudrama in question.79 We address 
issues of the constitutional value of commercial speech, of entertainment speech, of 
speech that is in some sense on a matter of public interest, and of theories of publicity 
rights injuries and damages below.80  
On the basis, then, of this brief look at how courts have addressed the publicity 
right claims of, respectively, Paris Hilton,81 Hugo Zacchini,82 and Olivia de 
                                                          
 71  See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001). 
 72  de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640 (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 404).  
 73  See id. We do not herein take issue with any version of the “creative transformation” test, 
or any other particular approach to reconciling publicity rights and free speech rights. For a 
discussion on that issue, see text accompanying infra note 98. 
 74  Id. at 641. Virtually all of the major characters, as well as the major actors portraying 
those characters, and even some persons otherwise associated with the production, were famous 
or popular in their own right. See id. 
 75  See id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  This analysis thus does not rely on a claim that substituting some other character in place 
of de Havilland would have worked as well artistically or economically. It is possible that the 
defendant’s creative transformation of the de Havilland character worked better than an attempt 
to creatively transform the identity of some other actor. 
 78  de Havilland, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 639. 
 79  See id. (citing Montana v. San Jose Mercury News Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 
(1995)). 
 80  See infra Section III. 
 81  See supra text accompanying notes 12–29. 
 82  See supra text accompanying notes notes 30–53. 
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Havilland,83 we proceed to consider the most crucial dimensions of the commonly 
claimed significance,84 and the actual insignificance, of publicity right claims in 
general. In particular, we focus first on the widespread—if not universal assumption—
that typical publicity rights cases importantly implicate, in one way or another, crucial 
concerns underlying the protection of freedom of speech.85  
III. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CASES AND THE SUPPOSED RISKS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Courts and commentators have claimed to detect significant conflicts, actual or 
potential, between otherwise appropriate recoveries for publicity rights violations and 
important free speech values.86 Thus, a leading expert has argued that “[a]s courts have 
expanded the right of publicity, the doctrine has come into conflict with the First 
Amendment more and more often.”87 The “creative transformation” inquiry discussed 
above88 is merely one kind of response to the conflict between right of publicity claims 
and free speech claims.89 But it has been argued that California’s creative 
transformation test in particular is insufficiently protective of free speech rights.90 
More generally, it is feared that commercial and even political and social content 
is threatened by enforcement of publicity rights. Thus, the distinguished scholars Mark 
Lemley and Eugene Volokh argue that commercial and non-commercial uses of a 
person’s identity can have “clear political or social content that would be stifled by 
application of the right of publicity.”91 Professors Lemley and Volokh question the 
constitutionality, under First Amendment challenge, or publicity rights in general:92  
 
In particular, the speech-restrictive potential of the right of publicity goes 
much further than that of trademark law, and even libel law, and it may 
                                                          
 83  See supra text accompanying notes 55–80. 
 84  See de Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 631.  
 85  See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001).  
 86  Id. 
 87  Mark Lemley, Reining in the Right of Publicity: Reflections by a Leading Scholar, 8 
LANDSLIDE 26, 27 (2016) (interview with Stanford Law Professor Mark Lemley).  
 88  See supra text accompanying notes 77–80. 
 89  See id.; Comedy III Productions, 21 P.3d at 809. 
 90  See, e.g., Thomas E. Kadri, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity Goes 
2-0 Against Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1529 (2014). 
 91  Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 225 (1998).  
 92  See id. at 227. 
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mean that the doctrine as a whole is substantively unconstitutional, at least 
as to noncommercial speech but perhaps even as to commercial speech.93 
  
Similarly, Professor Michael Madow argued that “publicity rights exact a higher 
cost in important competing values (notably free expression and cultural pluralism) 
than has generally been appreciated.”94 
The strongest case for such concerns would seem to involve distinctively political 
identities, as in the case of the estate of civil rights icon Rosa Parks.95 But the concern 
extends as well to evocations of large numbers of college football players,96 celebrity 
game show letter-turners,97 and to media of all sorts, including entertainment-oriented 
video games.98  
The extent to which the basic purposes for specially protecting speech are really 
implicated in publicity rights cases is, however, doubtful in the extreme. By 
consensus, the basic reasons for constitutionally protecting speech, beyond merely a 
typical legislative cost-benefit analysis, are several.99 These reasons, or values, are 
commonly thought to include the pursuit of meaningful truths,100 the pursuit of 
                                                          
 93  Id.; see also Brief On Behalf of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Defendants-Respondents, Gravano v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 389 
(N.Y. 2017) (on behalf of fourteen well-recognized IP and First Amendment professors) (case 
featuring celebrity Lindsay Lohan as a primary plaintiff). 
 94  Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 134, 145 (1993) (“the power to license is the power to suppress” 
and to some degree to control meaning). 
 95  See Rosa and Raymond Parks Inst. For Self-Development v. Target Corp., 812 F.3d 824, 
832 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[t]he use of Rosa Parks’ name and likeness in the books, movie, and 
plaque is necessary to chronicling and discussing the history of the Civil Rights Movement”). 
 96  See, e.g., Kadri, supra note 90 (discussing NCAA football-oriented video games using 
unnamed player uniform numbers, quantitative data, player performance statistics, etc., for 
many players and teams). 
 97  See White v. Samsung Elect. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(appropriation of a famous game show letter-turner’s identity, at least in some loose, futuristic, 
but recognizable sense, for the primary purpose of enhancing the sale of Samsung VCRs); see 
also Lemley & Volokh, supra note 91, at 225–27. 
 98  See Kadri, supra note 90; Mark Joseph Stern & Nat Stern, A New Test to Reconcile the 
Right of Publicity with Core First Amendment Values, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 93, 95 (2015) (“the 
very thing that makes video games so revolutionarily expressive—their ability to realistically 
depict interactive, fictional worlds—also puts them at a heightened risk of censorship under the 
guise of lawsuits.”). 
 99  For mainstream accounts, see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 119 (1989).  
 100  See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: The Search For Truth, and Collective Knowledge, 
70 SMU L. REV. 231, 232 (2017); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the 
Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 652 (1986). 
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genuinely democratic self-government,101 and the pursuit of some version of self-
realization or autonomy.102  
Invoking the value of the pursuit of meaningful truth in the the cases of Paris 
Hilton,103 Hugo Zacchini,104 or Olivia de Havilland105 and others would be implausible. 
No doubt there is some truth of the matter regarding many aspects of celebrities and 
non-celebrities. Statements about celebrities may be true or false. Nor is there any 
doubt that some persons are inclined to pursue, or at least attempt to profit from, such 
truths. But this involves, as the cases above imply, a pursuit of truth in only a distinctly 
limited sense.106 In particular, the pursuit of truth is typically involved in right of 
publicity cases, as distinct from other sorts of related tort and property cases, only in 
a sense that is not worthy of special constitutional protection.  
Even more clearly, it is implausible to suggest that the publicity rights cases 
typically involve attempts to contribute to democratic self-government, at least beyond 
the culture of commercialized amusements.107 Trading upon a celebrity’s image is not, 
and is not intended to be, a contemporary cultural equivalent of, say, the Lincoln-
Douglas debates.108 If we were to classify commercial attempts to partially appropriate 
celebrity images as attempted contributions to democratic self-government, we would 
jeopardize the very meaning of democratic self-government, as distinct from popular 
commercial culture itself.109  
In contrast, there is superficial plausibility in attempting to link the commercial 
appropriation of publicity rights with the free speech value of autonomy or self-
                                                          
 101  See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478 
(2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 493 
(2011). 
 102  See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 265 (2011); 
Susan J. Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312, 314 (1988); Brian 
Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 444 
(1998).  
 103  See supra text accompanying notes 12–29. 
 104  See supra text accompanying notes 30–53. 
 105  See supra text accompanying notes 55–80. 
 106  See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (one of a number of cases extending free speech protection to speech that does not 
attempt to convey any discernable particularized idea or truth-claim); Comedy III Productions, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001) (“[E]ntertainment . . . is entitled to 
constitutional protection irrespective of its contribution to the marketplace of ideas”). 
 107  See White v. Samsung Elect. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 108  See generally ABRAHAM LINCOLN & STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES (Bob Blaisdell, ed., 2004). 
 109  See White, 989 F.2d at 1520. 
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realization.110 There may be some minimal autonomy loss for the plaintiff whose 
identity is being partially appropriated.111 To be non-consensually, if only minimally, 
associated with any commercialized enterprise hardly advances the autonomy of that 
person.112 
The appropriating defendant is sometimes said to be pursuing its own individual 
or corporate autonomy, at least in some sense.113 There is certainly a sense in which 
choosing, as an individual or as a corporate entity, to borrow another person’s image 
can be said to reflect the chooser’s autonomy.114 But if this is what autonomy means, 
it is inevitably involved at least minimally on both sides of any case involving any 
social interaction, even if the case does not involve freedom of speech.115 
The deeper problem is that if autonomy is defined as anything like the ability to 
act as one chooses, it ceases to be a distinctive free speech value. Freedom of speech 
does not imply broader freedom of action and choice. We have a free speech clause, 
but there can be no general constitutional protection for freedom of action and choice, 
partly because of our inability to enshrine everyone’s conflicting choices,116 and partly 
because it is far from clear what a supposedly libertarian, or a freedom of choice-
oriented society, would look like.117 
The broader point is that if the values of meaningful truth, democratic self-
government, and autonomy are understood in constitutionally relevant senses, they 
will typically be implicated not at all, only minimally, or quite modestly on both sides 
                                                          
 110  See supra text accompanying note 102. In the publicity right context, see generally 
Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First Amendment 
and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 171 (2010). The autonomy 
of the plaintiff is typically more meaningfully at stake in consumer fraud, deception, and false 
endorsement cases. 
 111  Id.  
 112  See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL 27, 32 (John Christman ed., 
2014) (“[t]o the degree to which a person is autonomous he is not merely the mouth piece of 
other persons or forces”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective On Human Dignity, The First 
Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1365 (2009). 
 113  See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001) 
(referring to “mental exploration” and “the affirmation of the self”). 
 114  See, e.g., R.S. Downie & Elizabeth Telfer, Autonomy, 46 PHIL. 293, 293 (1971) (one 
sense of autonomy as focusing on “the capacity to choose what to do”); Thomas Hurka, Why 
Value Autonomy?, 13 SOCIAL THEORY & PRAC. 361, 361 (1987) (one concept of autonomy as 
involving the capacity “to direct oneself where different directions are possible”). For a 
metaphysically rich understanding of the idea of autonomy, see IMMANUEL KANT, 
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 114–16 (H.J. Paton trans., 1948) (1785). 
 115  See R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (And as Easy) as They Are, 
68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 342 (2002) (noting more generally the typical presence, in one 
manifestation or another, of autonomy and other free speech values on both sides of free speech 
cases). 
 116  My genuine preference as to choice and action would likely place me in the best seat at 
the popular concert. This preference cannot be fulfilled, in parallel fashion, for all concert goers. 
 117  Contra ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA (1974); MICHAEL OTSUKA, 
LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY (2005); LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds. 2001). 
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of the typical publicity rights case.118 If we focus, thus, on the underlying reasons for 
constitutionally protecting speech, we see that there is surprisingly little of free speech 
constitutional significance at stake in of the typical publicity rights case.  
The problem, at the most fundamental level, is that courts often seek to protect 
non-commercial speech where that speech, however interesting, is trivial from the 
standpoint of free speech values. Courts often declare instances of speech to be 
addressing a matter of genuine public interest and concern not by linking the speech 
to any fundamental values, but by concluding that some segment of the public might 
well happen to merely take an interest, for whatever reason, in the subject of the speech 
in question.119 The category of strongly protected speech is then said to include not 
merely political speech, even in a broad sense, but all “expressive” speech.120 
Expressive speech is thus strongly protected,121 as distinct from the lesser protection122 
                                                          
 118  See generally White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 
1993); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 797. 
 119  See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567–68 (1977) 
(referring generally to a “public right to be informed of matters of public interest and concern”); 
Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 884 F.3d 672, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2018); Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 
891, 902 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining conduct of and experiences in the Iraq War as “an issue of 
public concern”); Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no 
dispute that Hilton is a person ‘in the public eye’ and ‘a topic of widespread interest,’ and . . . 
[t]hus, Hallmark’s card is ‘in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest’”); 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Player’s Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(“Cardtoons’ parody trading cards receive full protection under the First Amendment. The cards 
provide social commentary on public figures, major league baseball players, who are involved 
in a significant commercial enterprise”); Nichols v. Moore, 334 F. Supp. 2d 944, 956 (E.D. 
Mich. 2004) (quoting the court’s opinion in the case of a well-known actress in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 117 (S.D.N.Y 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)) (“[T]he 
scope of the subject matter which may be considered of ‘public interest’ or ‘newsworthy’ has 
been defined in the most liberal and far-reaching terms”). 
 120  See Dora Georgescu, Two Tests Unite to Resolve the Tension Between the First 
Amendment and the Right of Publicity, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 916 (2014) (citing numerous 
cases); Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 969–70. 
 121  See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 122  See, e.g., Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About It: You’ve Got to Have Hart, 19 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 26, 65 (2013) (“Right of publicity claims arising in connection with commercial 
speech must satisfy intermediate scrutiny, while claims arising in connection with 
noncommercial speech must satisfy strict scrutiny”). For publicity rights cases turning on 
whether the defendant’s speech counts as “expressive” or instead merely as commercial speech, 
see Jordan v. Jewell Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2014) (a case involving a 
post-retirement Michael Jordan); see also Vrdolyak v. Avvo, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1384, 1389 
(N.D. Ill. 2016). 
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that is accorded to commercial, and thus presumably somehow non-expressive, 
speech.123 
This means, however, that along with wealth inequality, global migration, climate 
change, discrimination, civic insolvency, and political fragmentation, the re-use of 
Paris Hilton’s endorsement of one thing or another as “hot”124 counts, for 
constitutional purposes, as speech on a matter of public interest and concern.125 An 
observer might instead judge the question of the non-consensual use of transient 
catchphrases such as “that’s hot” to be merely tangential to the fate of the Republic 
and to the consensually basic free speech values.126 
Certainly, though, there are cases in which the publicity right claimant and the 
defendant in the case can show that one or more of the basic free speech values is 
meaningfully implicated in the case. Among such cases are those involving the estates 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.127 and Rosa Parks,128 of the 1960’s Civil Rights 
Movement.  
However, common sense suggests that in such cases, the defendant can typically 
make whatever political points the defendant wishes to make as clearly, undistortedly, 
forcefully, and subtly in one or more other ways that do not impair the plaintiff’s 
legitimate publicity rights.129 In a phrase, the defendant will typically have available 
constitutionally adequate alternative channels or venues for making whatever public 
interest point is sought to be made,130 such that protecting the publicity right in 
question imposes at worst de minimis free speech harm on the defendant.131 
                                                          
 123  The Supreme Court established the test for protection of “pure” commercial speech in 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980), 
as clarified in Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1991). If commercial speech allegedly 
infringing the plaintiff’s publicity rights is deemed to be false, misleading, or deceptive, such 
commercial speech can on that basis be restricted without any further inquiry, or any interest 
balancing, thus protecting any plaintiff interests. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64. For 
extended further discussion of the broader questions provoked by these attempted distinctions, 
see generally R. George Wright, Judicial Line Drawing and the Broader Culture: The Case of 
Politics and Entertainment, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341 (2012); R. George Wright, Speech On 
Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27 (1987). 
 124  Hilton, 599 F.3d at 908. 
 125  See id. at 908–09. 
 126  See supra text accompanying notes 93–95. 
 127  See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage 
Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (previous litigation between the parties 
discussing rights to commercial sales of busts and speech excerpts). 
 128  See, e.g., Parks v. Laface Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir 2003); Rosa and Raymond 
Parks Inst. for Self-Development v. Target, Corp., 812 F.3d 824, 832 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 129  Parks, 329 F.3d at 448. 
 130  For elaborate background, see R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free 
Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57 
(1989). 
 131  See id. at 89. 
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Thus, it is difficult to imagine that anyone wishing to make any meaningful point 
about, say, the historical roles of Dr. King or Rosa Parks must be frustrated in doing 
so, in terms of the consensual free speech values,132 unless allowed to invade an 
otherwise protection-worthy right of publicity.133 This sensible concern for the 
defendant’s realistic speech alternatives has some degree of support in one context or 
another.134 Whether the courts actually pay any attention to what one might call the 
free speech opportunity cost a given user faces135 is, for our purposes, of limited 
importance. More important is that in most, if not all, publicity rights cases, the free 
speech values at stake, even from the defendant user’s own perspective, would not be 
significantly impaired by requiring the defendant to use some expressive means that 
does not violate the plaintiff’s publicity rights.136 It is fair to conclude, then, that 
despite the standard rhetoric,137 the actual free speech stakes in typical publicity rights 
cases is minimal to non-existent.  
But one might still argue that the publicity rights cases are of genuine social 
significance on either of two remaining grounds. First, one might argue that apart from 
freedom of speech concerns, publicity rights cases in one way or another harmfully 
promote what one might call the celebrification of culture. We address this concern 
immediately below in Section IV.  
And second, one might argue for the significance of publicity rights cases in terms 
of the net social value of the damages recoveries thereby made available to plaintiffs. 
We take up this final concern in Section V below.  
                                                          
 132  See supra text accompanying notes 93–95. 
 133  Jason K. Levine, Can the Right of Publicity Afford Free Speech? A New Right of Publicity 
Test for First Amendment Cases, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 212 (2004). 
 134  See id. at 211–14 (discussing publicity rights cases); Russell S. Jones, The Flip Side of 
Privacy: The Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Constitutional Line Drawing—A 
Presumptive Approach, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 959 (2006) (“The appropriate balance 
should include considering whether the user of a celebrity’s rights in an expressive manner has 
reasonable available alternatives; put another way, whether the user could express his message 
in a different way”). But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Player’s Ass’n, 95 F.3d 
959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining a focus on the user’s adequate alternatives, or the lack 
thereof, as insufficiently protective of the broad interest in freedom of speech); Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of 
Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 79 IND. L.J. 47, 
113–14 (1994) (discussion of publicity rights cases). 
 135  Jones, supra note 134, at 944. 
 136  Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 971. 
 137  Roberta Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability 
Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 48, 56–57 (1995). 
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IV. BUT DON’T THE PUBLICITY RIGHTS CASES PROMOTE THE HARMFUL 
CELEBRIFICATION OF CULTURE? 
The concern that publicity rights cases damage the broader culture by promoting 
what we might call the celebrification of culture could come in either a plaintiff’s 
version, or a defendant’s version, or both. On the plaintiff’s version, the claim is that 
the defendant’s non-consensual, perhaps uninhibited,138 commercialized use of some 
aspect of the plaintiff’s identity contributes to this broader excessive celebrification.139 
On the defendant’s version, any undue celebrification effects would instead be 
attributed to the law’s recognition of the celebrity’s publicity rights, often of a rather 
broad scope,140 in the first place.  
It would certainly be possible for a reasonable person to detect today a substantial 
and perhaps increasing level of what we might label broad cultural celebrification. It 
is judicially thought that, at least at a given time, Paris Hilton’s “that’s hot” 
assessments amounted to speech on matters of genuine public concern.141 A partial 
explanation of this intriguing legal judgment might well involve what we could call 
the phenomenon of pervasive, normalized cultural celebrification.142  
As the term is used in this context, “celebrification” distinguishes the public’s 
response to a person’s desire for mere fame itself from a person’s “desire to be 
admired, appreciated, or respected for [their] skills or accomplishments.”143 
Celebrification refers only to the former. Celebrification may be related to, but is also 
distinct from, the broad phenomenon known as commodification.144 Whether our 
                                                          
 138  The negative and positive externalities of rights of publicity, and their efficient use over 
time, should not systematically vary as long as the relevant rights are clearly assigned to either 
the plaintiff or the defendant in these cases. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 139  David Tan, Beyond Trademark Law: What the Right of Publicity Can Learn lrom 
Cultural Studies, 25 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L. J. 913, 947 (2008). 
 140  See, e.g., Jennifer Rothman, Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity, LOY. L. SCH. 
(Dec. 14, 2017), www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law/california (discussing the important 
California common law and statutory publicity rights). 
 141  See supra text accompanying notes 12–16, 113–115. 
 142  Tan, supra note 139, at 947. 
 143  RICHARD KRAUT, WHAT IS GOOD AND WHY: THE ETHICS OF WELL-BEING 186 (2007). 
 144  See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY (2012); Joseph E. Davis, The Commodification of Self, 5 
THE HEDGEHOG R. 41 (2003), 
http://iasc.culture.org/THR/archives/Commodification/5.2Davis.pdf (explaining self-
commodification, marketing of the person, “personal branding,” and image cultivation aimed at 
pecuniary gain); Olivier Driessens, The Celebritization of Society and Culture: Understanding 
the Structural Dynamics of Celebrity Culture, 15 INT’L. J. CULTURAL STUDIES 641 (2013) 
(addressing celebrity commodification in several senses); Colin Leys & Barbara Harriss-White, 
Commodification: The Essence of Our Time, OPENDEMOCRACYUK (Apr. 2, 2012),  
www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/colin-leys-barbara-harriss-
white/commodificationwww.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/colin-leys-barbara-harriss-
white/commodification (“[T]he logical outcome of this process is the commodification of 
everything, unless political or social barriers prevent it”). 
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collective interest in mere celebrities, as distinct from cultural high achievers, is 
considered excessive145 or not, the phenomenon of celebrification does seem real.146  
It has been suggested more specifically that “[t]he cult of celebrity is producing a 
generation that believes education and hard work are not important in achieving 
success.”147 In remarkable numbers, children, if not also adults, hope for careers as 
popular entertainers, if not as mere celebrities.148 Clearly, the broader culture confers 
status upon persons deemed entertaining and amusing,149 whether all such persons are 
also thought of as genuinely talented or not.  
Perhaps interest in mere celebrity increases to the extent that success through more 
traditional employment and career options comes to seem more dubious.150 Perhaps 
any increased interest in celebrity is, fittingly, itself something of a passing fad, or a 
generational phenomenon.151 Perhaps the harmless or favorable elements of 
celebrification counterbalance its harm. Perhaps celebrification is actually caused by 
other harmful cultural phenomena, rather than itself being independently harmful.152 
Most crucially, though, whatever the cultural disvalue of celebrification in general, 
the availability of a publicity rights cause of action, as distinct from other tort and 
                                                          
 145  See, e.g., GRAEME TURNER, UNDERSTANDING CELEBRITY 3 (2d ed. 2014). 
 146  See id. at 3–4, 18, 94, 155. 
 147  Lucy Cockcroft, Cult of Celebrity ‘Is Harming Children,’ THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 
2008), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1581658/cult-of-celebrity-is-harming-children. 
 148  In the American context, see JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM 
EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 92–93 (2009); Yalda T. Uhls & Patricia M. 
Greenfield, The Rise of Fame: A Historical Content Analysis, MASARYK UNIV. (2011), 
https://cyberpsychology.eu/article/view/4243/3289. In the British context, see Twenge & 
Campbell, supra note 148, at 193; Camilla Turner, Revealed: Top Career Aspirations For 
Today’s Primary School Children, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 19, 2018), 
www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2018/01/19/revealed-top-career-aspirations-todays; Jacob 
Dirnhurber, VLOG’s a Job: Children Turn Backs on Traditional Careers in Favour of Internet 
Fame, Study Finds, THE SUN (May 22, 2017), www.thesun.co.uk/news/3617062/children-turn-
backs-on-traditional-careers. 
 149  See generally NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE 
AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS (2005). 
 150  But see Julia Glum, 53% of Millennials Expect to Become Millionaires One Day, 
According to New Study, TIME (June 11, 2018), http://time.com/money/5308043/millennials-
millionaires-new-study. 
 151  For background, see the evolving generational cohort differences interestingly described 
in JEAN M. TWENGE, IGEN: WHY TODAY’S SUPER-CONNECTED KIDS ARE GROWING UP LESS 
REBELLIOUS, MORE TOLERANT, LESS HAPPY—AND COMPLETELY UNPREPARED FOR 
ADULTHOOD—AND WHAT THAT MEANS FOR THE REST OF US (2017). 
 152  One would be hard pressed to argue that the Roman Empire collapsed due, precisely, to 
the availability of popular circuses. For background see Panem et Circenses, CAPITOLIUM 
(1999), www.capitolum.org/eng/imperatori//circenses.htm. 
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property claims, is at most only a minor contributor to any such disvalue.153 The 
popular attention devoted to celebrities is only minimally focused on non-consensual 
and legally unprotected uses of celebrity personas. Over the course of their careers, 
celebrities may “trend” for a variety of reasons, including their direct associations with 
popular entertainment.154 But the nature and value of their identity, “brand,” and 
legacy do not significantly hinge specifically on the availability of legal publicity right 
claims.155  
In particular, “even without the right of publicity the rate of return to stardom in 
the entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth a more than 
‘adequate’ supply of creative efforts and achievement.”156 In the extreme case, it is 
difficult to imagine many persons declining their otherwise preferred career as, say, a 
Paris Hilton157 or an Olivia de Havilland,158 because of the unavailability of a right of 
reputation in particular.159  
It is fair to conclude that the availability of, specifically, an enforceable legal right 
of publicity does not harmfully promote, to any meaningful extent, what has been 
called the celebrification of culture. But this leaves us with a final concern with regard 
to publicity rights. Is it likely that the damages recoveries and other remedies provided 
to successful publicity rights claimants, above and beyond merely publicizing their 
grievances, and the remedies available to such claimants under other causes of action, 
meaningfully promote the public well-being. We arrive at a generally skeptical answer 
to this question below.  
V. BUT DON’T PUBLICITY RIGHT RECOVERIES INVOLVE APPROPRIATE 
COMPENSATION AND MEANINGFULLY PROMOTE THE PUBLIC GOOD? 
As it turns out, providing for damages and related recoveries for publicity rights 
plaintiffs does not promote the broader public well-being to any meaningful degree. 
Any inclination we might have to analogize publicity rights cases to, say, actions for 
recovery for physical injuries, including medical bills and lost wages, is more 
misleading than helpful.  
                                                          
 153  See supra text accompanying note 148. 
 154  As of June 13, 2018, the Google query “Paris Hilton” generated about 25,400,000 hits. 
For what it may be worth, the Google query “Paris Hilton Hallmark” resulted in about 387,000 
hits, or approximately 1.52% of the broader total. 
 155  See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Player’s Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973–75(10th 
Cir. 1996); JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A 
PUBLIC WORLD 98–108 (2018). 
 156  Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 974 (quoting Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public 
Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 210 (1993)). 
 157  See supra text accompanying notes 12–29. 
 158  See supra text accompanying notes 55–80. Note the various roles, acting awards, 
honorary degrees, and titles of nobility conferred upon de Havilland, as reported at Olivia de 
Havilland, IMDB (2018), www.imdb.com/name/nm0000014/610. 
 159  We set aside here whether those who seriously consider celebrity-oriented careers may 
tend to be less, or more, financial risk-averse than average. For a brief background discussion, 
see Risk Averse, INVESTOPEDIA (2018), www.investopedia.com/terms/riskaverse.asp. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/6
2019] RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY  191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One entryway into this remarkably complex area is to divide publicity rights 
claimants into, however crudely, the famous, and the non-famous or non-celebrity. 
The initial problem with the latter, non-celebrity plaintiff category is that almost by 
definition, their own personal financial losses, whatever the scope of the defendant’s 
overall profits, are typically minimal.160 Nor does their name or identity, as an 
individual, tend to itself generate substantial profits for the defendant, above and 
beyond the defendant’s most profitable alternative opportunity.  
In most such non-celebrity cases, including the team sports video game context, 
the value of the product to the consumer is largely what we might call irreducibly 
“emergent”161 and collective in character. That is, the value to the consumer results 
largely from the defendant’s collecting, aggregating, and usefully processing of 
individual identities, such that the overall game, or other product, has value well above 
and beyond what is contributed separately by the individual players, or even by sets 
of players.162 By very loose analogy, most of the value of a wide-angle photo of troops 
storming a beach would not be due to the presence of any single recognized person or 
group.  
Beyond this, there lies severe problems of damages claim valuation. Often, courts 
have been generous toward publicity rights claimants, especially celebrities, in finding 
a genuine compensable legal injury.163 Once a non-consensual commercial use of a 
plaintiff’s image has been shown, some degree of legal injury and corresponding 
damages is presumed.164 In such cases, lack of the plaintiff’s—or at least a celebrity 
plaintiff’s—consent implies a damages award.165  
This practice may seem sensible in light of the familiar practice of awarding 
presumed damages in defamation cases.166 Meaningful tracing, in defamation cases, 
                                                          
 160  Consider, merely for example, the distinctive, more or less irreplaceable financial value 
added to a digital content provider or video game maker by one or more non-celebrity college 
team athletes. See, e.g., Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017); see 
also Dobrolowski v. Intellius, Inc., No. 17CV1519, 2017 WL 3720170 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 
2017). 
 161  See Timothy O’Connor & Hong Yu Wong, Emergent Properties, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. 
(June 3, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent. 
 162  Most sports video games do not feature intra-squad scrimmages of even the most popular 
established teams. 
 163  See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002); Newcombe v. 
Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1998); Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, 
14CV2703, 2018 WL 2224993 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2018); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 
2d 785, 806–07 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 164  See supra text accompanying note 144. 
 165  Solano, 292 F.3d at 1090. 
 166  See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) 
(plurality opinion) (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 765 (4th ed. 1971)). 
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of the injurious effects to one’s reputation may often be impractical.167 The truth never 
catches up with the lie. The long-term harm of defamation may be as subtle as a phone 
that does not ring. And the genuine harms of defamation may accrue over time, in 
ways impossible to calculate. It may thus be more sensible to speculate at a monetary 
value of such damages, or to set a minimum floor for such damages, than to assume 
that the value of unprovable damages in such defamation cases is zero.168  
The problem with presuming damages in publicity rights cases is that such cases 
do not relevantly resemble the defamation cases in which presumed damages may be 
appropriate.169 Defamation, by definition, requires something like a tendency to lower 
or impair the plaintiff’s reputation and perceived character.170 A typical reaction to 
credible defamation would thus be hostility, shunning, avoidance, or a sense of the 
shamefulness of the defamed party’s behavior.171 It is reasonable, in appropriate cases, 
to thus assume that undermining the victim’s reputation will tend to have adverse 
consequences for that victim.172  
However, publicity rights cases are typically not like this.173 At best, there can be 
no broad presumption that non-consensual users of the plaintiff’s identity expect to 
meaningfully diminish the plaintiff’s reputation, or to subject that plaintiff to hostility, 
shunning, avoidance, or disgrace.174 In many such cases, it would be clearly contrary 
to the user’s own interest to diminish the reputation of the party they wish to use to 
promote their product or service. There may be rare cases in which the user wishes to 
enhance its own already distinctively negative public image175 by somehow 
associating itself with the plaintiff. Even in those cases, however, typical consumers 
may not tend to shun or avoid the plaintiff.  
More generally, consumers’ reactions to non-consensual invocations of plaintiffs’ 
identities are likely to involve favorable, unfavorable, indifferent, minimal, equivocal, 
fleeting, ambivalent, or somehow offsetting responses.176 In any event, and as 
sympathetic as we might be to the plaintiff in question, it is simply unrealistic and 
inappropriate to construct a damages presumption in typical publicity rights cases.  
                                                          
 167  Id. at 754. 
 168  TURNER, supra note 145, at 3–4, 18, 94, 155. 
 169  Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 754. 
 170  See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 509–10 (1991) (stating under 
California law, defamation involves exposing the plaintiff to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or 
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him 
in his occupation”). 
 171  See id. 
 172  Defamation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 2014). 
 173  We again set aside the distinct set of consumer fraud and false endorsement cases. 
 174  See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Hoffman v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D.C.A. 1999); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable 
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 175  It seems fair to assume that market forces will in general tend to limit the influence of 
commercial enterprises with genuinely negative reputations among consumers. 
 176  See supra text accompanying note 174. 
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To assume, merely for example, that Paris Hilton suffers a meaningful, if 
untraceable, financial loss when the Hallmark Card Company utilizes her image, 
without evidently impairing or demeaning that image,177 is arbitrary in the extreme. 
We could just as well, if equally arbitrarily, consider such nonconsensual uses as name 
recognition-enhancing publicity for the plaintiff. Perhaps the plaintiff’s publicized 
objections to the non-consensual use generate further lucrative, or at least favorable, 
publicity for the plaintiff.178  
It is technically possible that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity could, 
by itself, trigger a public sense that the plaintiff has become “over-exposed,” to the 
plaintiff’s detriment.179 It is also possible that a defendant’s nonconsensual use of a 
plaintiff’s identity may revive or revitalize the plaintiff’s public presence, or even set 
off a favorable preference cascade,180 whether out of sympathy, nostalgia, or 
otherwise. And it is certainly possible that any effects on the plaintiff may be swamped 
by the collective impact of the many times in the course of the day that the celebrity 
is in other contexts referred to in social media and elsewhere.181  
Of course, not all publicity rights cases are brought by major celebrities, whether 
established, viral, or trending. Consider again the case of Hugo Zacchini, the Human 
                                                          
 177  See supra text accompanying notes 12–29. 
 178  See, e.g., What Is the Streisand Effect?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 16, 2013), 
www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2013/04/15/what-is-the-streisand-effect; Stacy 
Conrad, How Barbara Streisand Inspired the “Streisand Effect,” MENTAL FLOSS (Aug. 18, 
2015), http://mentalfloss.com/article/67299/how-barbara-streisand-inspired-streisand-effect. 
 179  It is certainly possible for a celebrity to be over-exposed in a career-damaging way. But 
this may be due to excessive voluntary as well as involuntary appearances. We cannot casually 
apply the theory of public goods, external effects, and uninternalized costs to publicity rights 
cases. There is only so much unowned grazable land, pollutable water, or sub-surface 
petroleum. Unspecified property rights in those cases can lead to overgrazing, polluted streams, 
and premature exhaustion of oil resources. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, THE EVOLUTION 
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). But the positive, even monetizable, 
associations of a particular celebrity’s name or image have no similar finitude, bounds, or 
quantifiablity. Sheep pastures do not typically go viral within hours. And it is even possible for 
a celebrity’s fame to enhance itself, as when being famous for being famous is itself a point of 
notoriety. Nor do publicity right values correspond to, say, grazing land or oil resource values 
in how they are dissipated or exhausted. Different sorts of “scarcity” are thus involved. 
 180  As more generally described in TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (reprint ed. 1997). 
 181  Commercial enterprises may today invoke the identity of Beyonce, without her consent, 
but also without falsely implying her endorsement. These invocations may even seem to 
logically “interfere” with one or more of Beyonce’s paid endorsement contracts. But these 
possibilities must be placed in the overwhelming context of Beyonce’s 248,000,000 Google hits 
and 15,200,000 Twitter followers (as of June 18, 2018). 
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Cannonball.182 Especially when one considers the complications of celebrity and non-
celebrity cases, it should not be surprising that “[t]here is no well-established method 
for valuing a right of publicity.”183 In Zacchini’s case, trying to select and draw upon 
some other specific prior publicity rights of the plaintiff as a baseline or guide for 
evaluating the appropriate damages in Zacchini would be not merely unusually 
speculative, but question-begging or circular.184 Who, by consensus, has brought a 
case that is usefully like Zacchini’s? Which prior claimant has priorities and 
circumstances like Zacchini’s? And trying to determine the outcome of a hypothetical 
voluntary negotiation process between Zacchini and the defendant is equally arbitrary 
and unmanageably complex.185  
The Zacchini case thus nicely illustrates some of the damages imponderables in 
publicity rights cases. It is possible, ironically, that Zacchini, at the time or thereafter, 
may have been best known among the general public precisely for his legal case and 
its United States Supreme Court determination.186 Whatever the potential for later or 
more widespread further abuse, the fifteen second act in question in Zacchini was 
actually broadcast only once, on a local television station, apparently part way through 
Zacchini’s local engagement at the Geauga County Fair.187 Thus, to a degree, the 
broadcast could be said to act as a full or partial substitute for paying to see Zacchini’s 
act in person.188 On the other hand, it is also possible that for some potential 
consumers, the broadcast of even the entire act, especially with favorable and directly 
                                                          
 182  See supra text accompanying notes 30–53. 
 183  Matthew Savare, The Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in Calculating 
Compensatory Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 151 (2004) (quoting Note, Federal Estate 
Tax and the Right of Publicity: Taxing Estates for Celebrity Value, 108 HARV. L. REV. 683, 688 
(1995)) (describing several dubious alternative methods, including a largely circular, if not 
arbitrary, consideration of what somehow “comparable” celebrities make). See also Cody 
Reaves, Show Me the Money: Determining a Celebrity’s Fair Market Value in a Right of 
Publicity Action, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 831, 836–37 (2017) (discussing an alternative 
method involving an attempt to determine the results, if any, of a hypothetical willing and 
consensual bargaining process between the defendant and the plaintiff). Note as well the 
possibility that the value of a celebrity name over time may be unusually volatile and 
unpredictable. See Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1143 (7th Cir. 1985) (Judge 
Posner’s discussion on such topic). 
 184  See Savare, supra note 183, at 151. 
 185  See Reaves, supra note 183, at 836–37. 
 186  Katies Thomas, Image Rights vs. Free Speech in Video Game Suit, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/sports/16videogame.html.  
 187  Zacchini’s act was videotaped and broadcast on August 31, with Zacchini’s local 
performances being scheduled for at least some dates in August and September. See Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  
 188  Bearing in mind that Zacchini’s entire act, and not just an excerpt, parody, or sampling 
thereof, was broadcast, whatever the visual and audio quality of the videotape or film involved. 
See id. at 575–76. 
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promotive commentary,189 tended to encourage their later paid attendance at a local 
performance.190 
But the fact that no one had paid for direct access solely to Zacchini’s act further 
clouds this speculation.191 Witnessing the performance live was merely one of the 
attractions of buying a pass to the fair in general.192  
In terms of incentives to produce popular entertainment,193 Zacchini’s best 
alternative option would likely not have been to engage in some other, less readily 
exploitable activity, but to actively enforce a contractual prohibition against filming 
without permission.194 It is possible to imagine Zacchini’s act being broadcast 
nationally, or perhaps during or prior to each of his various local appearances across 
the country. But this possibility would not assist in clarifying any damages issues. We 
would instead face additional guesswork in sorting out any possible net favorable or 
unfavorable effects, for Zacchini, from such widespread broadcast dissemination.  
The availability of a damages recovery for Zacchini might have some minimal 
effect—presumably negative—on whatever free speech values might otherwise be 
furthered by the more widespread visual distribution of Zacchini’s act.195 And as we 
have seen, courts have been inclined to constitutionally protect pure popular 
entertainment, absent any intended message, on a par with other non-commercial 
speech.196 But as with most right of publicity cases, the extent to which the public’s 
most convenient access to Zacchini’s cannon shot really implicates any of the basic 
reasons for distinctively protecting free speech197 seems minimal at best.198 And again, 
the real tradeoff in free speech values is not between the minimal such value of 
uninhibited broadcasting199 of the act and no such speech at all. Rather, the real free 
speech tradeoff is between the minimal free speech value of such broadcasts and the 
                                                          
 189  See id. at 564, 564 n.1. 
 190  Amounting thereby to timely, potentially valuable, unsolicited advertising. In this case, 
such benefit would accrue directly to the fair, and indirectly to Zacchini. 
 191  See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563. 
 192  See id. 
 193  See id. at 575–77. 
 194  See id. at 563–64 (denying permission and the defendant’s response the following day). 
 195  See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 196  See supra text accompanying notes 50–51. 
 197  See supra text accompanying notes 92–95. 
 198  See supra Section III. 
 199  Or the continuous universal availability of a high-quality video on popular platforms 
such as Youtube. 
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free speech values of the media’s next best speech alternative,200 whether that involves 
airing a visual excerpt of Zacchini’s act or not.201  
VI. CONCLUSION 
As a general matter, right of publicity claims, as defined and described herein, tend 
neither to significantly enhance nor to significantly detract from the public well-being 
or from the structure of basic rights worth recognizing. Neither the recognition nor the 
denial of publicity rights systematically affects the basic reasons for specially 
protecting freedom of speech. Nor do such publicity rights claims, or their 
unavailability, materially impact the phenomenon of cultural celebrification. Finally, 
it is essentially arbitrary to hold that right of publicity judgements typically involve 
distinctly appropriate compensation or other forms of promoting the common good.  
 
 
                                                          
 200  See supra text accompanying notes 118–119 on the value of free speech, including from 
the defendant’s perspective, of alternative speech channels and opportunities, which may be 
superior in terms of everyone’s free speech values, to that of the defendant’s regulated speech. 
 201  Note that when entertainment media decide what to disseminate, they may well to seek 
to very roughly maximize profit or shareholder wealth, as opposed to any vision of the 
maximizing of free speech values. For further discussion of complications associated with 
damage awards in publicity rights cases, see JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: 
PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 87–114 (2018). 
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